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China did not accept the concept of corporate 
criminal liability until late 1980s.? The first Chinese 
Criminal Law promulgated in 1979 (hereinafter the 
Criminal Law 1979) was generally believed to be a 
individualism code because, on one hand, the empha-
sis laid on defenders’ moral blameworthiness left no 
place for the liability of a fictional existence due to the 
influence of the criminal law ideology transplanted 
from former Soviet Union, and on the other hand, cor-
porate illegality could not be found at all before 1970s 
because of the strict adherence to planning economy 
system.? After the 1980s, along with commercial 
organizations being granted greater decision-making 
power thanking to the implementation of the reform 
and opening up policy, corporate crime, such as smug-
gling, tax evasion and environment pollution, led to a 
high degree of political attention. Although the major-
ity of criminal academics still firmly held a stand 
against the criminal liability of organizations, the 
Standing Committee of National People’s Congress 
(hereinafter, the Legislature) passed the Amendment 
to the Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on 22 January 1987, introducing corporate criminal 
liability for the first time. Ever since then, the Legisla-
ture has never stopped expanding its coverage. In 
recent fifteen years, a separate criminal law and eight 
Amendments to the Criminal Law had been passed, 
and nearly half of the articles are related to corporate 
criminal liability, either extending its coverage or 
enhancing severity of punishments.
However, the reality is that increasingly stringent 
corporate crime legislation has much weaker impact 
on preventing corporate crimes than expected. Then, 
why are Chinese policymakers still so keen on expand-
ing corporate criminal liability and what is the point? 
Why don’t State organs and State-owned enterprises 
that play a powerful, if not decisive, role in China’s 
political stage hinder corporate crime legislation that 
might affect their interests? This article is intended to 
answer these questions from a critical perspective. To 
this end, this paper first reviews the development and 
expansion of corporate crime legislation; Then, it con-
cludes that corporate crime legislation has more 
symbolic than practical significance on the basis of 
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The Legislature has been keeping expanding the coverage of corporate criminal liability ever since 1987, 
when the Customs Law introduced the concept into China. In one special criminal law and eight amendments 
approved after 1997, almost half of the articles defined new corporate crimes. However, the reality shows that 
increasingly stringent criminal legislation has limited impact on preventing corporate crime and is of only sym-
bolic and semiotic significance, just like the death penalty. Current political analysis of corporate crime legislation 
shows that corporations in influential positions, especially the state-owned ones, have little chance of being pun-
ished and expend low costs due to the absence of a well structured policy and undue importance laid on GDP 
growth by local governments. What is more, corporate crime legislation has been used to reduce the political pres-
sure resulting from corporate crime, enhance administrative discretion and protect local interests by governments 
as it can divert public attention from political system as a whole to isolated incidents and even individuals. There-
fore, this article holds that to carryout political reform is much more urgent than to strengthen criminal law to 
prevention of corporate crime.
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statistics and specific cases and holds that it is neces-
sary to read corporate crime legislation from a political 
perspective in order to understand the paradox 
between its expansion and uselessness; Finally, in the 
perspectives of state-owned enterprises, state agencies 
and the injured parties, etc, it explains the corporate 
crime legislation in a critical political aspect.
???? ??????????????????????????? ??
???????????
As mentioned above, Chinese legislators intro-
duced the concept of corporate criminal liability in 
spite of strong academic opposition in 1987 due to 
high political concern about the damage caused by 
corporate crimes and firm belief in the deterrence of 
criminal punishment as a social control tool. Since 
then, it continuously enacted more than ten separate 
criminal laws and supplementary criminal articles in 
administrative and economic laws, such as ‘Provisions 
on Punishing the Crimes of Smuggling’ (21 January 
1988), ‘Provisions on Punishing the Crimes of Tax 
Evasion and Refusal to Pay Tax’ (4 September 1992), 
‘Decision on Punishing Crimes of Producing and Sell-
ing Counterfeit Consumer Goods ‘(2 July 1993), 
‘Decision on Punishing Crimes of Disrupting Finan-
cial Order’ (30 June 1995) and ‘Decision on Punishing 
Crimes of Falsely Making out, Forging  and Illegally 
Selling Invoices’ (30 October 1995). In 1997 when the 
Criminal Law 1979 was comprehensively amended, 
the Legislature incorporated relative articles into the 
Criminal Law 1997 and defined the concept of corpo-
rate crime and the principles of punishment 
respectively in Article 30 and 31. According to article 
30 of the Criminal Law 1997, corporate crime refers 
to (i) an act committed by an organization such as a 
company, an enterprise, an institution or a State organ 
that endangers society with (ii) a guilty mind and is 
(iii) prescribed by law as a crime.
Nine chapters of the Special Part of the Criminal 
Law 1997 provide 136 specific corporate crimes,? 
except for Chapter X, Crimes of Servicemen’s Trans-
gression of Duties. The absolute majority of corporate 
crimes involve acts disturbing economic order, impair-
ing social administration and endangering public 
security. Specifically, Eighty crimes are provided in 
chapter three, Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the 
Socialist Market Economy, accounting for 59 percent 
of the total; thirty five in chapter six, Crimes of 
Obstructing the Administration of Public Order, 
accounting for 26 percent; eight in chapter two, 
Crimes of Endangering Public Security, accounting 
for 6 percent, leaving only thirteen (9 percent) for the 
remaining six chapters. Such a distribution is obvi-
ously consistent with the original intention of 
decision-making authorities to deter corporate crimi-
nality through criminal punishment, the most severe 
sanction that a society can utilize.
After the promulgation of the Criminal Law 1997, 
the Legislature continues to extend the scope of corpo-
rate criminal liability. The ‘Decision of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on Pun-
ishing Crimes of Fraudulently Purchasing, Evading 
and Illegally Trading in Foreign Exchange’ adopted on 
29 December 1998 created the ‘crime of fraudulently 
purchasing in foreign exchange’ and made corpora-
tions punishable for the crime of illegal business 
operation in Article 225 of the Criminal Law 1997. 
Thereafter, seven of eight Amendments to the Crimi-
nal Law 1997 created fifteen new corporate crimes, 
increasing the total number to 153.
In addition to creating new crimes, the Legisla-
ture extended the coverage of corporate punishment in 
the Criminal Law1997 through following two 
approaches. One is to change the constitution of a 
crime, such as widening the coverage of its actor. For 
example, according to article 163 of the Criminal Law 
1997, it is a crime where an employee of a company or 
enterprise who, taking advantage of his position, 
demands money or property from another person or 
illegally accepts another person’s money or property 
in return for the benefits he seeks for such person. The 
central government of China launched a special cam-
paign against commercial bribery in 2005 and was 
confronted with difficulties in punishing doctors in 
hospital who accepted bribery, because they are nei-
ther state functionaries nor employees of a company, 
institution or enterprises. In a word, they couldn’t be 
punished according to the Criminal Law 1997.? 
Therefore, The Amendment VI to the Criminal Law 
1997 adopted on 29 June 2006 revised the article and 
extended the coverage of actor from ‘an employee of a 
company or enterprise’ to ‘an employee of a company, 
enterprise or other units’ and thereby made it possible 
to punish an employee of any organization including 
doctors.
The other is to lower conviction threshold. For 
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example, article 145 of the Criminal Law 1997 pro-
vides that a conviction can be handed over where s/he 
produces medical apparatus and instruments or medi-
cal hygiene materials that aren’t up to the national or 
trade standards for safeguarding human health or sells 
such products clearly being aware of the fact and 
thereby causes serious harm to human health. The 
Amendment IV to the Criminal Law 1997 adopted on 
28 December 2002 deleted the ‘serious harm’ require-
ment and provides instead that it is enough to give a 
conviction where the actor is aware of the fact that the 
medical apparatus and instruments or medical hygiene 
materials that s/he produces or sells aren’t up to the 
national or trade standards for safeguarding human 
health and harmful enough to seriously endanger 
human health. The conviction threshold here is appar-
ently lowered by the substitution of the requirement 
for an actual harm with that for a possibility to cause 
harm.
Then, has the corporate crime legislation achieved 
the intention of legislators and played the expected 
role of preventing corporate crime?
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On this issue, both the macroscopic and micro-
cosmic statistics have shown little optimism. Chinese 
judicial authorities do not release detailed statistics, 
mostly a general number or percentage, on convictions 
and sentences regularly as the US and Japanese gov-
ernments do and we therefore have no access to annual 
data of charged corporations and punishments. How-
ever, the fact that nearly 60 percent of specific 
corporate crimes are in chapter three of Special Part of 
the Criminal Law 1997, Crimes of Disrupting the 
Order of the Socialist Market Economy and these 
crimes are usually committed by organizations in 
practice makes it possible for us to draw a general pic-
ture referring to annual statistics of related criminal 
cases heard in people’s courts.
According to China Statistical Yearbooks released 
by the National Bureau of Statistics, the number of 
cases involving crimes of disrupting the order of the 
socialist market economy heard at the first instance by 
people’s courts at all levels increases rapidly (as Fig-
ure 1 shows), from 7454 in 1997 to 16940 in 2000, by 
nearly 127 percent in three years. From 2002 to 2004, 
the number drops slightly from 14953 in 2002 to 
13957 in 2004 and basically reveals a stable trend. 
From 2004 to 2011, the number shows a continuous 
upward trend and since 2006, the increasing trend is 
much more obvious than ever. Considering the abso-
lute amount, the number has increased by 144 percent 
from 13957 in 2004 to 34103 in 2011. Compared with 
1997, the total number in 2011 increases by 357 per-
cent, more than a threefold increase. Therefore, the 
above comes to the conclusion that although legisla-
tors have been strengthening legislation of economic 
crimes and corporate crimes, they haven’t achieved 
expected outcomes.
Seeing from the microcosmic perspective, statis-
tics regarding typical corporate crimes indicates that 
we should not be optimistic either. For example, the 
Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law 1997 that came 
into force as of 1 May 2011 made it a crime to refuse 
to pay labour remuneration because it ‘has become a 
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prevailing social phenomenon in recent years, which 
not only seriously violates the legitimate rights and 
interests of ordinary workers but also causes great 
negative impact on the construction of socialist har-
monious society, and administrative and civil legal 
measures cannot effectively regulate such acts.’? Did 
the criminalization of refusing to pay labour remuner-
ation work? The fact is that ‘refusing to pay 
remuneration is getting even more malicious and 
intensified nationwide. Few corporations have actually 
been prosecuted.’? ‘Labour security supervision 
authorities received totally 218,000 complaints involv-
ing refusing to pay labour remuneration in 2012, an 
increase of 5 percent compared to previous year. 
While people’s courts at all levels only filed 152 crim-
inal cases with 134 being closed by December 2012. 
This is obviously disproportionate.’?
Similarly, the Amendment IV to the Criminal 
Law 1997 passed on 28 December 2002 made it a 
crime to employ a minor under the age of 16 to con-
duct physical labour of ultra-intensity because, as a 
high-rank official of the Legislature once commented, 
‘a big number of companies, in order to seek illegal 
interests, employ minors, and some even employ child 
labour to do physical labour of ultra-intensity, or 
engage in aerial, underground work, or work in explo-
sive, flammable, radioactive, toxic and other 
hazardous environment, which seriously endangers the 
health of minors and even causes death conse-
quences.’? However, it seems that the newly created 
crime hasn’t worked at all. On 10 June 2007, the Inter-
national Trade Union Confederation denounced the 
Beijing 2008 official licensed Olympics souvenir 
manufacturers for employing child labour; shortly 
after, the Shanxi brickyard child slave labour scandal 
broke. The youngest victim was only eight years old 
and oldest less than thirteen. What is more shocking is 
that it is not until 400 parents sought for help together 
on the Internet did the local police authority try to res-
cue, but only, their children.? In 2008, one accident in 
Hezhou, Guangzhou province, killed one child labour 
and severely hurt 12 children. ‘The heart-wrenching 
phenomenon of child labour not only occurs in remote 
and poor regions, you can also see innocent faces drip-
ping with sweat, working busily in car repair stalls, 
markets and garbage stations in developed regions of 
the urban fringe.’? Even the multinational enterprise 
like Samsung was denounced for illegal employment 
of child labour in China by China Labour Watch, an 
American organization which intends to protect labour 
interests and rights.?
The last example is corporate bribery. Article 387 
and article 393 of the Criminal Law 1997 respectively 
provides accepting and offering bribery by corpora-
tions, and as mentioned above, the Legislature 
extended the coverage of article 164 when the special 
campaign against commercial bribery was launched in 
2005. Has any expected effect been achieved? The 
answer is no. Let’s take multinational corporations 
conducting business in China as example. According 
to a report released in 2009 by Anbound Group, a non-
official economic analysis organization in China, 
‘there has been an upward trend of bribery among 
multinational corporations in China. At least 500,000 
cases have been investigated in the past decade, 64 
percent of which involves international trade and for-
eign businesses.’? Moreover, influential and notorious 
corporate bribery cases occur one after another since 
2002. For instance, in 2004, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission investigated Lucent who dur-
ing the past three years arranged and paid for the trips 
for almost one thousand Chinese government officials 
and executives running telecom businesses to Hawaii, 
Las Vegas, Grand Canyon, Disneyland and New York 
under the disguise of ‘factory visiting and training,’ 
costing Lucent millions of dollars. In 2005, a report 
released by the American Department of Justice 
reveals that the Diagnostic Products Corporation Tian-
jin Branch has been bribing doctors from the stated-
owned hospitals for 11 years from 1991 and the bribe 
amounts to 1,623,000 US dollars.?
The widespread existence of refusing to pay 
labour remuneration, employing minors and corporate 
bribery shows the disrespect and even defiance of cor-
porations to the criminal law. In other words, present 
corporate crime legislation plays a little role in helping 
corporations establishing a law-abiding culture, at 
least in relation to the three categories of crimes here.
Meanwhile, those prevention measures and policy 
strength that are considered effective to reduce corpo-
rate crimes in the macroscopic perspective haven’t 
been attached enough political attention. Instead, they 
are unduly restricted. For instance, as to protecting 
labour interests, wage interests included, and child 
interests, neutral active NGOs like Labour Union have 
played an indispensable role in western countries 
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through organizing demonstration, offering free legal 
aid, filing public interest lawsuit, etc. However, due to 
systemic reasons like government control, China actu-
ally doesn’t have many NGOs in the real sense. As it 
was once commented, ‘there had been 211661 NGOs 
in China as early as in 2007. The number is huge but 
among these organizations labelled NGO, only a few 
can operate independently. The reason is that the abso-
lute majority of these organizations are founded by 
government. Nearly 50 percent of their budget comes 
from government and related subsidies, and 3.6 per-
cent from government-supported research funds. 
Besides, many non-governmental organizations them-
selves were transformed government agencies or 
organizations established by the government.’? On 
the other hand, as for those NGOs that operate inde-
pendently, local governments usually adopt the ‘Three 
No’ principle: ‘no contacting, no recognizing, and no 
banning.’ However, they will interfere directly with 
and even take compulsory measures on activities of 
those NGOs when specific cases arise, especially in 
cases where a large number of victims are involved in 
order to reduce negative political effect and sometimes 
to protect political prospects of liable individuals. In a 
word, it is unrealistic for NGOs to play an effective 
role in preventing corporate illegality as it is to a high 
degree controlled by public powers and lacks legal 
space to carry out activities freely.
What’s more, GDP is an important unsaid promo-
tion touchstone for local officials in current political 
structure. An political achievements and promotion 
analysis report of 283 mayors and Party secretaries in 
small and meddle-sized cities in the past decade in 
China released in May 2013 by Professor Deng Yong-
heng, Dean of Real Estate Research Institute of 
National University of Singapore, shows that if GDP 
increases by 0.3 percent over the previous term, the 
promotion probability is 8% higher. If resource is con-
stantly spent on people’s livelihood and environmental 
protection, the probability is negative.? Therefore, 
local governments are more concerned with local eco-
nomic interests rather than social welfare in reality 
and are reluctant to sanction corporations that contrib-
ute to GDP growth. And this partly explains why it is 
common to see political pressure from superior party 
organizations or administrative organs plays a crucial 
role in prosecuting a locally influential corporation.
Sanlu milk power contamination scandal is a typi-
cal example that resulted in more than ten death and 
thousands of injuries. Since December 2007, Sanlu 
Group, a giant state-owned dairy producer located in 
Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei Province, 
started to receive complaints from infant milk formula 
consumers who found red, solid substance in their 
children’s urine, and even reports showing that infants 
got sick of kidney. But the company didn’t carry out 
inspections so as to solve the problem at all, either did 
Consumers’ Associations actively involve after receiv-
ing complaints. In August of the same year, the local 
government received Sanlu’s test report indicating the 
complained products contain toxic substances but 
made no public notice. On the contrary, one of the 
vice-mayors of Shijiazhuang municipal government 
ordered Sanlu managerial level to keep the contamina-
tion secret ‘for fear of social unrest and so as not to 
embarrass the country so soon before the Olympics.’? 
Not until early September when the State Council of 
China received a briefing from the New Zealand gov-
ernment did the local government began investigation 
under heavy political pressure.? When victims tried to 
file lawsuits claiming compensation, although NGOs 
represented by voluntary lawyers planned to offer 
legal aid and other supports, their activities were 
immediately controlled.? The hostile attitude and 
resistance of the local government in the Sanlu case 
are just the epitome of local governments’ real con-
cerns with corporate crimes, especially those relating 
to food safety, environment pollution and product 
quality. It might be said to a certain extent that strict 
implementation of corporate crime legislation can 
barely gain full political support at local level.
In brief, both macroscopic and microcosmic sta-
tistics have shown that China’s current corporate 
crime legislation is not strictly implemented. Mean-
while, it has been confronted with political resistance 
and has to stand alone sometimes because of the weak 
role of civil society. As a consequence, corporate 
crime legislation is only significant as a symbol show-
ing a political attitude towards corporate crime. Then, 
why do Chinese policy-makers still keep amending 
criminal law and expanding the coverage of corporate 
criminal liability? What sense does it make to pass 
new laws destined to achieve nothing other than a few 
more convictions? Moreover, as is well known, state-
owned enterprises hold a strong position in China’s 
political and economic state. Why did they never try 
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to obstruct corporate crime legislation that may be 
applied to them? To answer these questions needs a 
political reading of corporate crime legislation.
???? ????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????
In the situation of corporate crime, there are usu-
ally three direct parties: guilty corporations, victims 
who suffer from corporate illegality and state agencies 
responsible for supervision and investigation. 
Although corporate crime legislation as a whole is of 
symbolic significance, it has different and particular 
meanings to the three parties.
First of all, state-owned and large-scale private 
enterprises have little chance of being punished and 
instead could even benefit from illegal acts by taking 
advantage of their political influence. For example, the 
authorities in charge of food safety and quality exam-
ined milk powder produced by 22 dairy companies 
after the Sanlu scandal in September 2008. Results 
showed that almost all products contained melamine, 
which obviously didn’t meet the national standard.? 
However, the eventual outcome of the event shocked 
the whole country and sparked national outrage 
because the authorities didn’t strictly enforce the 
national standard and order dairy companies to 
enhance the quality of their products. On the contrary, 
they lowered the milk quality standard to meet dairy 
companies’ interests when revising the national stan-
dard of dairy product in 2010.?
Similarly, the safety of Telunsu milk produced by 
Mengniu Dairy was questioned in early February 2009 
because the additive called OMP it contains hadn’t 
been approved by any law or administrative authority. 
Available research data suggests that the addictive 
contributes to the growth of both healthy and cancer 
cells and even carcinogenicity. Scholars have clearly 
stated that drinking the milk would increase the risk of 
catching cancer.? The State Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine therefore 
issued an official notice, prohibiting Mengniu from 
adding the OMP into Telunsu. Ironically, the result 
was that the Ministry of Health stated that the OMP 
isn’t a food ingredient up to the National Health Stan-
dards and Mengniu didn’t use OMP upon prior 
application, while claiming the product wasn’t hazard-
ous to consumers’ health.? This conclusion magically 
turned the illegal additive into lawful invention.
Third example is environment pollution crime. It 
has been universally accepted that the economic 
development in China is to a high degree at the cost of 
environment destruction and sacrifice of legal rights 
of average citizens, as shown in the report on ‘Cancer 
Villages’ in recent ten years, which shocked both 
China and the whole world due to the massive depri-
val of health and even life of peasants who had been 
living at the polluted area.? As a result, the Amend-
ment VIII to the Criminal Law 1997 revised article 
338 from ‘the crime causing major environmental pol-
lution accident’ to ‘crime of environmental pollution’ 
and thereby lowered the conviction standard. Has the 
legislation actually improved environmental law 
enforcement? Undoubtedly, it has been put into legal 
practice.? However, just like the crime of refusing to 
pay labour remuneration and the crime of illegally 
employing minors mentioned above, ‘it is very likely 
that the local government and the enterprise form 
interest alliance and jointly resist the pollution abate-
ment and regulatory policies made by the central 
government. It’s not hard to imagine that the policy 
was ignored by local governments, and relevant laws 
and regulations become blank words in the book.’?
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the increas-
ingly stringent corporate crime legislation may be 
used to help powerful corporations to beat their com-
petitors, mainly small and medium-sized enterprises, 
especially those private owned small ones, and expand 
their market share because of their complicated rela-
tionship with government officials that makes 
selective law enforcement possible.
As far as stage agencies are concerned, one of the 
prime reasons that the Legislature extends corporate 
crime legislation is to provide legal basis for law 
enforcement authorities. For instance, the Legislature 
specifies in Introduction to the Amendment VII to the 
Criminal Law 1997 (Draft) that the reason that corpo-
rate criminal liability was extended to the crime of 
shielding or concealing criminal proceeds in article 
312 of the Criminal Law 1997 is that ‘the People’s 
Bank of China states that it is usually committed by 
organizations in practice and therefore to punish it as a 
corporate crime is necessary in order to strengthen 
anti-money laundry measures.’? However, the real 
significance of corporate crime legislation to adminis-
trative authorities lies not here but in the following 
three aspects.
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First, corporate crime legislation reduces the 
responsibility of administrative organs without weak-
ening their power. The fact that an act is made a crime 
means the responsibility to deal with it is shifted from 
administrative authorities to judicial organs. Accord-
ing to the Criminal Procedure Law, apart from cases 
of bribery, corruption and dereliction of duty, investi-
gation of other criminal cases is in the charge of public 
security organs. As can be seen in Figure 2, millions 
of criminal and administration of public security cases 
(hereinafter, administrative cases) are placed on file by 
public security organs at all levels each year. The total 
number has been increasing rapidly ever since 2006 
and exceeded ten million in 2008 (twelve millions in 
2011). Confronted with such an intensive pressure, 
public security organs will surely put priority on main-
taining social stability, the greatest political task 
overwhelming everything, instead of investigating 
case involving relatively few persons, and reasonable 
citizens won’t unduly expect from them because of the 
influence of the ideology of sacrificing individual for 
collective interest. That is, even if such acts as refus-
ing to pay remuneration, employing child labour and 
possessing forged invoices are included into the crimi-
nal law, judicial organs are not capable of enforcing 
related articles effectively and efficiently due to the 
limited judicial resources.
While increasing the burden of public security 
organ, corporate crime legislation reduces the burden 
and enhances discretion of administrative organs. On 
one hand, they don’t have to deal with those acts in 
question because they have been criminalized and fell 
into the hands of judicial organs ‘theoretically’. On the 
other hand, both administrative and criminal laws 
haven’t deprived them of sanctioning power, and thus 
whether, when and how to exert their power are 
completely at the will of their own ‘legally’. As a con-
sequence, criminalization of certain acts that used to 
be provided in administrative laws enlarges space for 
administrative organs to selectively enforce law 
instead of offering victims’ remedy due to limited 
number of charges and high cost they have to bear. 
Victims have actually been put between a rock and a 
hard place. Take refusing to pay remuneration as an 
example. Victims could resort to labour administrative 
organs and apply for compulsive measures before the 
passage of the Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law 
of 1997. But thereafter, those organs can easily shift 
the responsibility to the hands of public security 
organs telling complainants to go to the police because 
that it is a crime now. As explained above, it is usually 
unrealistic for them to gain expected help from the 
police.
Second, corporate crime legislation enables the 
government to defuse public anger and relieve domes-
tic pressure without taking no substantive correction 
measures. It can be clearly seen from above explora-
tion that the pursuit of GDP growth, resistance of local 
governments and absence of internal regulation inside 
corporations are main causes of corporate crime. Cor-
respondingly, political reform aiming at promoting 
transparency and democracy in using administrative 
powers is much more urgent and effective to preven-
tion of corporate crime, just as has been commented: 
‘what is urgent for Chinese political reform now isn’t 
to resolve the issue of democracy and freedom at 
western sense but the problem of power corruption. 
Chinese officials are granted the power that can barely 
been seen in other parts of the world but receives fee-
ble supervision. Therefore, Chinese political reform 
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should first be focused on power supervision and look 
for an economical and efficient supervision method 
using present systemic resource.’? However, the real-
ity is that decision makers are reluctant to make due 
efforts to promote political reform.
As mentioned above, bribery crime is one of the 
focuses of current corporate crimes, as well as where 
Chinese people attach much attention. According to 
the public poll about safety index conducted by the 
National Bureau of Statistics, when asked the question 
of ‘your top concerns,’ 7.6% of respondents chose 
‘corruption’ in 2007; the number in 2006 was 9.1 per-
cent; in 2005, it was 12.6 percent; in 2004, it was 
14.26 percent and in 2003, it was 15.92 percent.? And 
a majority of those who committed bribery crimes, 
especially those accepting bribery from corporations, 
work in state organs. It is true that China has always 
maintained a strict attitude towards corruption issue. 
An official report disclosed that during the decade 
from 2002 to 2012, eleven high-rank officials were 
executed and twenty seven were sentenced to death 
with two-year suspension because of corruption and 
bribery.? However, no substantial steps have been 
taken in tackling systemic cause of corruption. ‘Cor-
ruption is a common challenge faced by all States in 
the world. Two approaches that are universally consid-
ered effective presently are (i) check and balance 
among political powers and (ii) fairness and transpar-
ency in use of powers,’? and ‘it has become a public 
consensus in China that prevention system should be 
strengthened through adopting such laws as property 
declaration law.’? Legislative efforts regarding the 
property declaration law and relevant systems have 
been stumbled all the way in China. Although had 
appeared in legislation program as early as in 1994, 
the property declaration law hasn’t entered formal pro-
cedure so far. When reviewing the draft of the Civil 
Servant Law in 2005, the Legislature refused the pro-
posal to include property declaration issue. In the 
beginning of 2012, the Legislature repeated again its 
explanation in responding to public appeals for prop-
erty declaration system that there were stil l 
fundamental obstacles to overcome before opening the 
legislative procedure for the system and internal con-
ditions weren’t mature yet.?
Meanwhile, similar to powerful corporations, 
although punishable according to the Criminal Law 
1997, State organs have barely been punished in real-
ity, except very few cases in mid-1990s.? For 
example, the Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law 
1997 extended corporate criminal liability to the crime 
of possessing counterfeit invoice, which had been 
proven to be a useful tool in such crimes as tax eva-
sion and fraud and embezzlement. Meanwhile, the 
central government launched a special campaign 
against producing and using counterfeit invoice. 
According to the National Audit Office, fifty six cen-
tral State organs were found to use false invoices and 
the total amount reached 1.42 million RMB in 2011, 
but none was punished.?
A more vivid example is the Urumqi railway 
transport intermediate people’s court (hereinafter, the 
defendant court) bribery case in 2006, where the 
defendant court was accused of accepting bribery pro-
vided in article 387 of the Criminal Law 1997.? 
During the first court session, the defence counsel 
questioned the constitutionality of the accusation, 
holding that although article 30 of the Criminal Law 
1997 doesn’t exclude the criminal liability of the peo-
ple’s court, if convicted, could the defendant court 
continue to exercise judicial power and function as the 
Constitution provides? Moreover, shall the convicted 
court continue to exist or be disbanded? On the con-
trary, the majority of academic researchers insisted 
that the defendant court should incur criminal liability 
from the perspective of present legislation. For exam-
ple, Liu Renwen, professor at the Institute of Law of 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out that 
‘no legal barrier could be found in prosecuting the 
people’s courts. Chinese criminal law expressly pro-
vides that it is a crime of accepting bribery where a 
State organ, State-owned company, enterprise, institu-
tion or people’s organization illegally accepts another 
person’s money or property, and people’s courts are 
included in the “State organs” in the article 30.’? 
However, after carefully considering possible negative 
influence of the case on public trust in and authority of 
judicial organs and listening to suggestions from the 
court hearing the case, the prosecution withdraw the 
accusation against the defendant Court by substituting 
it with individuals who had been charged as the per-
sons who were directly in charge and other persons 
who should take direct liability. In other words, the 
defendant court was exempted from criminal charge.
Third, to prosecute and severely punish corpora-
tions and liable individuals helps to protect concrete 
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benefit of local governments as it diverts public atten-
tion and offers a shield against political pressure 
imposed by superior authorities. Local governments 
have to face public condemns almost after every inci-
dent that caused widespread harm. A common choice 
of local governments in crisis management is to 
strictly investigate the criminal responsibility of the 
individual so as to calm down the public and at the 
same time save concrete interests. Let take the Sanlu 
case for an example again. According to the estimation 
in public reports, the whole property of Sanlu Group 
was barely enough to pay for victim compensation.? 
What did the municipal government of Shijiazhuang 
do? It rushed to sell the company’s validated assets 
such as land use right, buildings, machinery and 
investment interests,? while responding to public con-
demn by punishing liable individuals harshly.? Not 
long after the criminal trial was closed, Sanlu Group 
was declared bankrupted in November 2009 and the 
gate to compensation for the children suffering calcu-
lus was shut down.? It can be clearly seen that the 
local government successfully kept the company’s 
fixed assets and most of its concrete benefits and lost 
nothing other than a commercial brand.
Briefly, the reason that State organs and powerful 
corporations, especially State-owned enterprises, did 
nothing to hinder the adoption of corporate crime leg-
islations isn’t that they are incapable but that they can 
benefit from it without their illegal act being punished. 
Once they feel the danger that a new law will hamper 
their interests, they will spare no effort to block its 
legislative procedure even if it is concerned with over-
all social welfare and national security. For example, 
the World Bank announced that the Gini coefficient in 
China had reached to 0.47 in 2010, which implies that 
the wealth gap was unlimitedly close to the bottom 
line that the society could tolerate. Four major house-
hold income surveys since the 1980s also indicated 
that the income gap between 10% of the highest and 
lowest income range had increased from 7.3 times in 
1988 to 23 times in 2007.? Hence, the central govern-
ment started drafting the overall plan for the 
reformation of income distribution system in 2004 and 
finished drafting the new Wage Regulation, in which 
the adjustment of distribution of powerful State-owned 
corporations is one of the focuses. Nonetheless, the 
regulation hasn’t been entered formal legislative pro-
cedure so far due to the strong opposition of the 
monopolies.?
Finally, corporate crime legislation consoles vic-
tims. ‘Seeing from the creation and development of 
criminal penalty, it has been a long period from per-
sonal revenge to central national justice. During this 
long period, criminal penalty has kept the primitive 
nature of revenge. So it exists, to a great extend, to 
satisfy victims’ wishes of taking revenge.’? Corporate 
crime legislation, although has merely symbolic sig-
nificances in general, can undoubtedly work in 
consoling victims and their families and satisfying 
their revenge emotion and thereby prevent their pri-
vate revenge or radical acts in particular cases. In 
addition, the strengthening of corporate crime legisla-
tion and severe punishments in individual cases can 
placate the public’s resentment to culpable individuals 
and distract public attention from structural and sys-
temic causes of corporate crime.
?????????????
‘The introduction of corporate criminal liability is 
a hasty response of the Legislature to social pressure 
and lacks profound theoretical exploration.’? There-
fore, corporate crime legislation in China was ironed a 
deep political mark in its very beginning. Since the 
1990s, corporate crime increased rapidly along with 
reforms in economic systems deepening and a market 
mechanism gradually coming into existence. Shocked 
by massive harm to individual property and rights  and 
social stability caused by corporate crimes, the Legis-
lature has been continuously strengthening corporate 
crime legislation, extending the coverage corporate 
criminal liability or providing harsher punishments. 
Unfortunately, the absence of a well-structured policy, 
the reluctance of decision makers to carry out political 
reform and direct intervention of governments with 
economic and judicial activities rendered corporate 
crime legislation as a whole a symbolic response to 
public anxiety.
One of the fundamental principles in Chinese 
political economy textbooks is that ‘economic base 
determines superstructure, and superstructure reacts to 
economic base.’ This principle, if applied to current 
situation of corporate crime, would be followed by the 
conclusion that in order to reduce corporate crime, an 
abnormal phenomenon in economic base, what is the 
most crucial now is not to strengthen criminal law, 
although necessary, but to reform the superstructure, 
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such as perfecting supervision on law enforcement and 
weakening political influence of corporations on gov-
ernments by cutting off interest link between them. In 
a word, only when corporations, particularly powerful 
State-owned enterprises, fear and respect it can corpo-
rate crime legislation work as expected.
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